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Haultain, T. A.

A LETTER
TO
ARCHBISHOP LYNCH

With the author's compliments?

A CRITIQUE

OF

CARDINAL NEWMAN'S

Exposition of the Illative Sense

EMBODIED IN

'A LETTER

TO

ARCHBISHOP LYNCH

BY

T ARNOLD HAULTAIN M A

TORONTO

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THE CHURCH

OF THE

UNITED METHODIST CHURCH

OF THE

UNITED STATES

AND TERRITORIES

To the Most Reverend

JOHN JOSEPH LYNCH, D.D.,

ARCHBISHOP OF TORONTO, PRELATE ASSISTANT OF THE PONTIFICAL THRONE,

YOUR GRACE :

You have so often, both by published writing and pulpit utterance, taken upon yourself the defence of the denomination in which you hold so exalted a position, that I venture to address to you a letter embodying a criticism of a doctrine promulgated by one of the most eminent of the Cardinals of that denomination. The doctrine to which I refer is that of the possibility of attaining to certitude by means of an illative sense. I shall proceed without further delay to place before you my reasons for not believing in such possibility.

To the Hon. Member

JOHN JOSEPH LYNN, D.D.

RECEIVED - AT THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

January 11, 1901

Dear Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th inst. in relation to the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which provides for the election of the President and Vice-President by the electors of the several States. I have the honor to inform you that the same has been referred to the Committee on the Constitution, and that they are now considering the same. I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Yours very truly,
John Joseph Lynn, D.D.

ἐμοὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἴσως ὥσπερ καὶ σοὶ τὸ
μὲν σαφὲς εἶδέναι ἐν τῷ νῦν βίῳ ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ παγκάλεπόν τι.—
PLATO, *Phædo*, 85, c.

X

IT is now more than thirteen years since the first publication of Mr. Froude's criticism of Cardinal Newman's *Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent*. During this time religious discussion has been so rife that we may unhesitatingly say that it has formed an essential feature of the greater part of our heavier periodical literature. I need not, then, I think, hesitate to call your attention to a portion of this famous work—and that an exceedingly important portion—which Mr. Froude has left altogether untouched. Especially too, as it is the boast of the Church of which the author of that work is so illustrious a representative, and of which, so far at all events as England and Ireland are concerned, he is so deservedly revered a spokesman, that it is her system that supereminently stands confronting the attacks of those agnostic theories which one of her latest defenders sums up in the word "Naturalism." "It is her glory," writes this brilliant apologist, "that among the multitudinous religions of men, she is specially singled out by the anti-Christian movement as its irreconcilable foe." "The Catholic Church is in the forefront of the battle." (1)

It will be generally conceded that, of all the religions which profess to exhibit a rational and coherent exposition of the origin and end of man, and which declare that either certain unique and unalterable *deposita*, or certain infallible formularies, contain this exposition,

1. W. S. Lilly. "The Religious Future of the World."—*Contemporary Review*, February, 1883.

the Roman Catholic Church has most conspicuously succeeded in moulding herself to the varying progression and retrocession of human sagacity, and the vicissitudes of popular sympathy or distrust. It is in this supreme endeavour to conform to the spirit of the age, that there is likely to lurk the most serious source of error. To glance at one of the most fluctuating of religious questions: that of the province of reason in the attainment of theological truths, we shall find that she has invariably adjusted her position to the force of extraneous opposition or support. And at the present day, more, perhaps, than ever before, seeing that reason in all extra-religious matters holds a position inexpugnable, and evinces an ever-encroaching power, she is wont to descend somewhat from the stand she has occasionally taken, and to allow, with certain reservations, its claim to be the touchstone of human knowledge.

In harmony, apparently, with this tendency, Cardinal Newman, striving to bring certain religious principles within the grasp of those who deny the possibility of a supernatural perception of the reality of Christianity, and recognizing the fruitlessness of attempting to prove that the reasoning powers alone can obtain for us that absolute assurance which, in matters eternal, all seek, falls back upon the illative sense. It is in this, and that an exceedingly momentous, doctrine of the Cardinal's, that I hope to show there lies concealed a grave and radical defect.

That this attainment of certitude is the office assigned to the illative sense as explained in chapter ix. of the work mentioned, the following quotations will prove:—"In any inquiry about things in the concrete

men differ from each other, not so much in the soundness of their reasoning as in the principles which govern its exercise, . . . those principles are of a personal character, . . . where there is no common measure of minds, there is no common measure of arguments, and . . . the validity of proof is determined, not by any scientific test, but by the illative sense."⁽²⁾ "I follow him [Amort] in holding, that . . . we are not justified, in the case of concrete reasoning, and especially of religious inquiry, in waiting till . . . logical demonstration is ours, but on the contrary are bound in conscience to seek truth and to look for certainty by modes of proof, which, when reduced to the shape of formal propositions, fail to satisfy the severe requisitions of science."⁽³⁾ What, then, is this illative sense? It is a "mental faculty" to which "is committed" "the sole and final judgment on the validity of an inference in concrete matter."⁽⁴⁾ Not the process of reasoning, but the "regulating principle of all reasoning;" "concerned with the soundness of the reasoning."⁽⁵⁾ "Any investigation whatever . . . will suffice to show how impossible it is to apply the cumbrous apparatus of verbal reasoning to its continuous necessities, and how imperative it is to fall back upon that native good sense (that is, the action of our illative judgment upon our personal view of things) which legitimately trusts itself because there is nothing else given it to trust."⁽⁶⁾ "It determines what science cannot determine, the limit of converging probabilities, and the reasons sufficient for a proof."⁽⁷⁾ These are the most definite

2. *Op. cit.*, Part II. Ch. X § 2.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Ch. ix.

5. Ch. ix § 3.

6. Ch. ix § 2.

7. *Ibid.*

utterances that can be culled from the explanation of the subject; but they are not more vague than is the object of such explanation itself shadowy and intangible, and as such I intend to treat it.

I. Anyone, hearing of an apparition, would consider that there was, *prima facie*, evidence against the fact of its objective existence, because it is contrary to all recognized notions of the law of the uniformity of nature; in other words, the probabilities are in favour of believing, that all so-called spectral phenonema can be explained away on a purely natural foundation.

II. If, indeed, the unearthly visitor can be personally examined, and can show credentials intelligible to mundane minds of its supernal, infernal, or merely immaterial source, we need go no farther.

III. But if all its actions can be shown to be not without the sphere of an ordinary mortal, a strong chain of condemnatory evidence is forthcoming.

IV. If the particular individual who personated the ghost can be discovered, all doubt is at an end.

Let us apply this to Cardinal Newman's illative sense.

I. Seeing that "certitude does not admit of an interior immediate test, sufficient to discriminate it from false certitude;"⁽⁸⁾ that, "for genuine proof in concrete matter we require an *organon* more delicate, versatile, and elastic than verbal argumentation;"⁽⁹⁾ that "inference, considered in the shape of verbal argumentation, determines neither our principles, nor our ultimate judgments,—that it is neither the test

8. Ch. vii. §2.

9. Ch. viii. §1.

of truth nor the adequate basis of assent ; "⁽¹⁰⁾ His Eminence has recourse to an " unscientific reasoning," which " has a higher source than logical rule," which is born, not made, "⁽¹¹⁾ analogous to *phronesis* in matters of conduct, to taste in the fine, and to skill in the economic, arts. "⁽¹²⁾ Beguiled by the extreme subtlety of the processes of the mind, he must assert the existence of an unknown and undemonstrable entity as the source of such phenonema. That is to say, believing himself to possess, and believing that all can possess, an assurance which, he perceives, is not the product of the ordinarily classified intellectual powers, he conceives of a power superior to all these powers : not that of reasoning, but one that supersedes and controls reason ; not the process of drawing conclusions, but an authority that dictates whether or not conclusions shall be accepted ; not anything that entered into the universally preconceived conceptions of the laws of mind, but a separate, distinct, and auxiliary faculty. On the face of it, this theory is highly suspicious, and, as such, should be subjected to the severest scrutiny.

II. Let us, however, granting, despite its unfavourable aspect, the reality of this spectral sense, examine its credentials. There are three different points of view from which it may be considered :—

A. Can the " higher source " signify a divine source ? Are we to understand, that, in the exercise of the mind in the search for religious truth, the natural faculties are aided by a Spiritual illumination, a specific and divinely-granted adjunct to a weak and faltering

10. *Ibid.*

11. Ch. viii. §3.

12. Ch. ix. §2.

reason? No; this, a view perfectly legitimate, and containing in it no inconsistencies if certain not rare premises are posited, cannot be the interpretation of Cardinal Newman's position. Were it so, he could not possibly have omitted somewhere to have so categorically asserted. And yet we find that he strenuously avoids the application of even the epithet "moral" to the certitude springing from the utilisation of this sense, and only once, after much hesitation, does he so make use of it. Perfectly easily too, might we have so construed his elucidation, had he given us the slightest encouragement. For it is not, as far as I know, a doctrine alien to the church he has joined. The following sentences from one who has, I believe, gone through a very similar process of thought, culminating, in like manner, in a secession from Anglo- to Roman-Catholicism, seems to imply a belief that some such coalition exists:—"We do not assent, then, to these dogmatic truths of revelation, whatever they may be, because we see them—because they are evident . . . it would be forced assent . . . and all merit would consequently cease." "God's grace is ever invisibly working with us on our journey towards faith."⁽¹³⁾ Doubtless the learned Cardinal—to whom indeed the last-mentioned author dedicates the volume quoted from—holds a like view; indeed he himself thus writes: "It must be recollected that theological reasoning professes to be sustained by a more than human power, and be guaranteed by a more than human authority."⁽¹⁴⁾ But certain it is, that the illative sense is not the explanation of the workings of such power,

13. *Sermons by Fathers of the Society of Jesus*. Vol. II. by Rev. T. Harper, S. J. Sermon V.

14. *Op. cit.* Ch. ix. § 3.

nor the evidences of such guarantee. But, after all, were this the true explanation, the possession of such certitude would be valueless, for—the owner being powerless to transfer so superhumanly implanted, and so purely subjective, a gift—the certitude becomes as useless to others as the water of crystallization in a Sahara rock to a parched Arab, or the latent heat of an ice-floe to a freezing Lap.

B. From certain expressions used with reference to the nature of this illative sense—expressions such as a “present imagination” which “reaches to conclusions above and beyond” “methodical processes of inference;” ⁽¹⁵⁾ a “natural, uncultivated faculty, sometimes approaching to a gift;” ⁽¹⁶⁾ a “native good sense;” ⁽¹⁷⁾ a “personal gift;” ⁽¹⁸⁾ or “habit;” ⁽¹⁹⁾ etc., we might very pardonably conjecture that this sense was a sort of logical *clairvoyance*, which overleapt the bounds of ordinary reasoning, and was only saved from the epithet of irrational by the fact that its exploits were utterly inconceivable. True, we do sometimes appear to avail ourselves of an indefinable power of choice.

“It lies not in our power to love or hate,
For will in us is over-ruled by fate,
When two are stript, long ere the course begin,
We wish that one should lose, the other win;
And one especially do we affect
Of two gold ingots, like in each respect.
The reason no man knows; let it suffice,
What we behold is censured by our eyes.”⁽²⁰⁾

But if I may be allowed the saying *videntem dicere verum quid vetat?* I can compare such lawless *per saltum* conclusion to nothing better than to the trick of projecting a coin into the air to determine which of

15. Ch. viii. § 2.
16. Ch. viii. § 3
17. Ch. ix. § 3

18. Ch. vii. § 2.
19. Ch. vii. § 2.
20. *Hero and Leander*. Marlowe. 1st Scatiad.

two courses shall be adopted when the recommendations of each seem in equipoise, and therefore unfit to take upon itself the high duties imposed by the Cardinal on his illative sense.

C. A cursory and uncritical examination of the nature of this sense, might lead one to suppose that it is identical in its operation with that to which logicians have given the name 'anticipation'—the faculty, which, by a glorious guess as it were, seizes a truth prior to the proper perception of its proofs. Such was Newton's law, which saw in the revolutions of the planets, the action of the same force that governs a falling apple. Such too, probably, was Darwin's grand generalization explaining the origin of species in the animal kingdom. That this, however, is by no means the province of the illative sense, the following brief comparison will establish :—

a Anticipation is an attempt to discover hidden causes ; the illative sense determines which of several causes already found shall be accepted.

b Anticipation is verified by subsequent ordinary proofs ; the illative sense over-rides, and is not amenable to, ordinary proofs.

c Anticipation, *per se*, is not trustworthy ; trustworthiness is the peculiar property of the illative sense.

There ought, properly, next to be considered the analogies stated to exist between the illative sense and *phronesis*, taste, and skill. I am not, however, at all desirous of discovering any discrepancies in such analogies, in as much as this will depend upon the general outline of my line of argument. But when we read on the one hand of *phronesis*, that it is " the faculty which

guides the mind in matters of conduct;" that it is "the directing, controlling, and determining principle in such matters;" that it is "seated in the mind of the individual, who is thus his own law, his own teacher, and his own judge in those special cases of duty which are personal to him;"⁽²¹⁾ and when we read on the other hand of conscience, that it "is not a judgment upon any speculative truth, any abstract doctrine, but bears immediately on conduct, on something to be done or not done;" that it is "the practical judgment or dictate of reason, by which we judge what *hic et nunc* is to be done as being good, or to be avoided as evil;"⁽²²⁾ we are very forcibly struck with the identity of conscience and *phronesis*. But of conscience we are told that it "is a messenger from Him, who . . . speaks to us behind a veil . . . is the aboriginal Vicar of Christ;" "the voice of conscience is the Divine Authority."⁽²³⁾ So that if—as appears—conscience and *phronesis* are one and the same thing, may we not justly ask if it is right to draw an analogy between the illative sense and this one thing by whatever name we call it? Does not the divine nature of this mentor nullify its comparison to any purely natural power?

On the subject of taste, indeed, it is impossible so definitively to maintain the existence of any discrepancy, because, unfortunately, despite the extreme variety of the views that have been urged as regards taste, the learned prelate has omitted to vouchsafe to us any clue by which to discover the peculiar signifi-

21 *Op. cit.* Ch. ix. § 2.

22. Dr. John Henry Newman's *Reply to Mr. Gladstone's Pamphlet*, § 5.

23. *Ibid.*—I have of course, as Your Grace will notice, been careful to quote from Cardinal Newman himself throughout this argument.

cation he himself attaches to the term. There is, indeed, one extremely high authority on this subject to whom His Eminence might have appealed as seeming to substantiate the aptness of the analogy between taste and the illative sense. Mr. Ruskin thus writes : "The differences in the accuracy of the lines of the Torso of the Vatican . . . from those in one of M. Angelo's finest works, . . . rests on points of such traceless and refined delicacy, that, though we feel them in the result, we cannot follow them in the details. . . . But suppose that the best sculptor in the world, possessing the most entire appreciation of the excellence of the Torso, were to sit down, pen in hand, to try and tell us wherein the peculiar truth of each line consisted. Could any words that he could use make us feel the hairbreadth of depth and distance on which all depends?" Yet to me it seems that there is this ineradicable distinction between taste in the fine arts and the illative sense, which completely extirpates the seeming appositeness of the analogy. Although the *mind* may not always be able distinctly to state the grounds of the superiority of any one piece of sculpture, architecture, painting, or music to another, the *educated eye or ear* can. One important element of good taste is a keen and appreciative organ of sense. With purely mental processes the case is different ; there is here nothing but a mind to think and judgments to be weighed. In the one case, superadded to all that appeals to the intellect, the object of contemplation contains form, colour, or sound ; in the other case, the object of contemplation contains only a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion. So with skill ; one of its chief factors is a high develop-

ment of a purely physiological operation, viz., the co-ordination of muscular movement.

If we grant this, then, we cannot allow that any analogies can be drawn between such dissimilar processes as those of the illative sense and taste and skill.

I may not, perhaps, have been as explicit in this part of my criticism as I could wish to have been. What I am trying to show is that, if indeed by these analogies His Eminence wishes to teach us nothing more than the fact that, just as taste and skill are, to a certain extent, natural gifts, so there are men who excel in argumentative ability, my strictures will not, of course, lie. But if he means that, just as a good ear can detect a false note, and a good eye will appreciate a beautiful combination of form and colour, so there is a faculty in the mind that intuitively grasps truth and eschews error, then I cannot but maintain that no such analogy exists. But for the proof of this, as I have remarked, I must rely upon my general line of argument.

III. We are forced, then, to the conclusion that the credentials of this shadowy sense are spurious; we shall further find that all its actions are explicable on other and well-known grounds.

We are told that it is an "extra-logical" faculty, a faculty superior to the "apparatus of verbal reasoning." But what are we to understand by this decrial of "verbal reasoning?" I fail to appreciate the deprecation of this reasoning, until it is shown to be other than that which the mind spontaneously performs reduced to scientific forms. And this the Cardi-

nal omits to do. The science of logic is not a mere empty phantasm of the brain, but a methodical arrangement of the way in which the mind thinks ; not—to explain it by analogy—a “ Siren ” which, by the turning of a handle, is made to imitate certain sounds, but the science of akoustics, which explains what sound is and how produced. To say that logic does not exhibit the whole process by which a conclusion is reached is scarcely correct ; “ the laws of thought themselves are few in number, and lie, in examples of perpetual occurrence, under every thinking man’s observation.”⁽²⁴⁾ That the majority of mankind draw conclusions by processes which they are unable to put down in black and white, does not vitiate the theory. M. Jourdain was astonished to learn that he talked prose. If, however, it is His Eminence’s opinion that logic is wanting in this direction—that it fails to cover the range usually attributed to it, he might have treated us to an *excursus* to that effect. At the very least, he ought explicitly to have shown why it is that in simple trains of thought, common logic is amply sufficient, while, in complex ones, it entirely breaks down. That it is “ cumbrous ” does not prove it invalid. But to say that it is in concrete cases that the office of the illative sense lies ; in long and complex discussions ; when the ordinary method of reasoning would be cumbrous ; when there are many converging probabilities. are suspicious phrases. When an artery is lost to sight in its capillaries, the dissector does not immediately promulgate a new theory of the circulatory system. And surely the most abstract

24. *An Outline of the Necessary Laws of Thought* Abp. Thomson, Intro. § 4.

theory is built upon, and contains nothing foreign to, concrete facts.

But the simplest way of showing that all the functions of the illative sense are performed by this maligned logic, is to take the Cardinal's own example of its exercise. Speaking of the various contradictions that exist amongst the different historians of the pre-historic period of Greece and Rome, "We see," he remarks, "how a controversy . . . is carried on from starting points, and with collateral aids, not formally proved, but more or less assumed, the process of assumption lying in the action of the Illative sense, applied to primary elements of thought respectively congenial to the disputants." And he adds, "Should it be objected, apropos of this particular case, that the instinctive reasoning on which I have been dwelling, is not worth much, since it has not brought the disputants into agreement, I answer that I profess to be stating facts, not devising an optimism." "Moreover," he says, "it must be recollected, that the controversy is still in its beginnings; and there is no reason for deciding that it will not lead in the event to a unanimous conclusion of some kind, that is, either to an assent to one particular view of the history as the true one, or else to a conviction that no true view is attainable."⁽²⁵⁾ That is to say, a juster estimate, and one on which more reliance may be placed, of this portion of history will accrue, if all the disputants but one merge their illative senses in deference to the illative sense of that one; or, better still, when, without exception, they eliminate their

25. *Op. cit.* Ch. ix. § 3.

illative senses altogether, and rely solely upon "the existing data for proof." Its value varies inversely as its employment, and the more nearly its exercise approaches zero, the nearer shall we be to the attainment of truth; or, if truth is beyond our reach, the more certain shall we be that it is so. If it is urged that it is the accumulation of fresh facts that places the illative sense in abeyance, I answer that no one will hesitate to accede to the proposition that the accumulation of fresh facts is the surest road to an indisputable conclusion, and, therefore, the greater the abeyance the better. At all events, who shall decide at what point we shall cease to collect facts and rely on the illative sense?

Again, as the Cardinal himself suggests, we may very properly urge that it is worth absolutely nothing, when we see its employment resulting in such contrarieties of opinion. What difference, for example, can we discover between the "high path of divination" by which we are told "Niebuhr does consciously proceed,"⁽²⁶⁾ (which is given as a sample of that "collateral aid, not formally proved but more or less assumed, the process of assumption lying in the action of the illative sense,") and the "*part de divination et de conjecture*," which Renan thinks "*doit être permise*" in a criticism of the Gospels?⁽²⁷⁾ And if they are one and the same thing, and this identical with the faculty upon which our author relies, and we find it demolishing in one case all that it has built up in the other, who will, after such evidence, trust himself to so inconstant and inefficient a branch of the architectonic

26. *Op. cit.* Ch. ix. § 3.

27. *Vie de Jésus*, p. 35. Paris: 1867.

faculty? And the Cardinal himself tells us that he arrived once at a wrong conclusion—not because he did not use his illative sense, but because his illative sense acted “on mistaken elements of thought.”⁽²⁸⁾ So that it appears we had better be quite sure of our “elements of thought,” whatever they may be, before utilising our illative senses.

IV. We find, then, (1) that since the illative sense, avowedly transcends logical processes, the assertion of its existence may legitimately be deemed obnoxious to discredit; (2) that, since it is not a divine illumination, nor a logical second-sight, nor anticipation, it fails to vindicate the exalted position allotted to it; (3) that, when all the functions assigned to it are relegated to ordinary methods of ratiocination, with a greater amount of confidence may the ultimate conclusion be accepted. Nevertheless, as with all ghostly phenomena, even after their rational explanation, there remains in the mind an impression that such negative evidence is, after all, unsatisfactory, it is necessary, for the perfect clearing up of the mystery, to seize, and personally to interrogate, the individual, who, we conclude, must have simulated its actions.

“Men’s opinions, accordingly, on what is laudable or blameable” (I quote from the *Essay on Liberty*,) “are affected by all the multifarious causes which influence their wishes in regard to the conduct of others, and which are as numerous as those which determine their wishes on any other subject. Sometimes their reason—at other times their prejudices or superstitions: often their social affections, not sel-

28. *Op cit* Ch. ix. § 3. (4).

dom their antisocial ones, their envy or jealousy, their arrogance or contemptuousness : but most commonly, their desires or fears for themselves—their legitimate or illegitimate self-interest.”⁽²⁹⁾ So, too, is it with men’s opinions on what is true or false. Not even were we able to unify this multifariousness, and to define exactly what it is that leads men to accept and retain with the utmost obstinacy, any one position in defiance of the claims of all others, and which, in ordinary language, goes by the phrase of “being certain,” but which very commonly means being led by natural propensity or prejudication, not even then, could we call the object of such definition the “illative sense.” But, indeed, it is absurd so to attempt to unify such intricate influences. Even when we have to the best of our ability banished prejudice,—to the best of our ability, for is it possible ever entirely to do so, except perhaps in the matter of some abstract or wholly impersonal science?—and acted upon, as far as we see, purely rational grounds, our opinions are determined, not, surely, by an illative sense, but by the combined effect of all those impressions which previous observation and reflection have left upon the mind, the several links of which, though so entangled by oblivion that no power can exhibit their natural sequence, yet retain, despite perchance some little rust, an invincible force. And the certitude that results does not fulfil the duties of the Reverend Doctor’s illative sense ; such influences merely bring about that sort of assurance which suffices for common things and every-

29. *On Liberty*. John Stuart Mill. Ch. I.

day life, and whether they lead to assents that are genuine or assents that are not genuine, there is nothing by which to discover.

What Cardinal Newman attempts to do is to chase beyond the confines of the *terra firma* of logic, a bright and attractive light that shall illuminate all the mysteriousness of the *terra incognita* beyond the senses. But is it not an *ignis fatuus*? He tells us it leads to certitude, and he tells us that "it is the characteristic of certitude that its object is a truth,"⁽³⁰⁾ but he forgets that "truth is one and eternal,"⁽³¹⁾ and that so-called "truths" are mere links in a chain, the ends of which are invisible to the human intellect; no link of which can possibly be grasped or comprehended independently of its relation to all the rest.

And this is beyond us. Glimpses are all we get. Knowledge is a stream. No stream ever flows, or can flow, entirely round any point. We must in this life remain satisfied with a limited, one-sided view. And a limited, one-sided view never results in certitude. It is this partial view that Cardinal Newman strives to surmount. But in this attempt he soars above that stream only to a region whose vapours cloud a landscape already not too clear.

In this experiment; in thus trying to point out to us how we may attain to a certitude suited to the eternalness of things divine—indelectible and unchanging, he has found himself on what to-day is the great *campus philosophorum*. Rejecting, apparently, the extreme view of the bolder doctrine, that to those who, in seeking eternal truth, are "pure in heart,"

30. *Op. cit.* Ch. vii. §2.

31. *Institutes of Law*. Lorimer, Bk. I., ch. xii., § c.

shall be given a power to "see God;" ⁽³²⁾ and rejecting, I presume, the theory of the impossibility of obtaining positive knowledge of the hypo-phenomenal, the absolute, His Eminence essays a compromise by trying to prove that the mind itself contains that by which it can transcend itself.

32. S. Matthew, ch. V. v. 8.

These, your Grace, are my arguments for disbelieving in the existence of an illative sense. You may ask: "How do they concern me?" Thus: If these arguments be valid, one of the corner stones of your church, erected by one of its greatest supporters, crumbles away. You, as the head of this archbishopric, may reasonably be expected to attempt their refutation.

I have the honour to be

Your Grace's humble servant,

THE AUTHOR.

University College, Toronto, Canada.

